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1. The background 
 
The last two decades have witnessed the globalization of markets, leading to the 
internationalization of firms at an unprecedented scale across different countries. The 
governments in many countries have removed different types of barriers to entry in business, 
allowed greater degree of foreign ownership in FDI, eased up capital controls and relaxed rules 
for participation of foreign institutional investment in the capital market. All these moves have 
helped the markets to become globally connected. Such policies in turn have encouraged 
many firms to internationalize themselves via various means, including exporting their 
products to global markets, cross-listing at international exchanges with significantly stricter 
legal, monitoring and governance regimes, acquiring firms across borders and issuing 
securities like ADR etc. 
Simultaneously, the shift towards International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
reforms in the internal corporate governance laws and the creation of new financial markets 
or adapting the existing ones to conform to global norms have certainly contributed to the 
uniformity of standards for judging and comparing the performances of firms over a period of 
time both within and across economies. All these had a direct impact on a firm’s choice of 
corporate governance structure from a weak to stronger legal regimes as well as altering 
global investors’ feasibility sets for the allocation of portfolio investments. The firms found 
opportunities to align themselves to better governance systems and to migrate to better 
monitoring regimes, which reduced information asymmetry and improved their stock market 
valuations in many cases. On the other hand, the integration of access to capital markets by 
global investors reduced fragmentation and led to reductions in the cost of capital and better 
access to financing in the world capital markets. The latest trend towards bringing about the 
uniformity of global standards in auditing and the market micro-structure of trading 
contribute to this overall trend.  
While the huge body of early work on corporate governance shows that the 
internationalization of firms in globalized markets brings about changes in the governance, 
valuation and functioning of firms, the results are not uniform across countries. This could be 
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due to the fact that internationalization, globalization and the attendant forces that bring 
uniformity in markets do not operate in a vacuum. They rather interact symbiotically with the 
institutions like the political systems, income or wealth distribution, and indigenous 
institutions peculiar to a country’s history (e.g., family firms, financing network, efficiency of 
bankruptcy procedures, financial institutions catering to specific communities). Such factors, 
however, are not easily malleable and may not have the inner flexibility to change along with 
the speed of changes brought about by the integration of global financial or product markets. 
In response to these developments, research in the general field of corporate finance 
has been continuously making inroads into new areas while expanding the frontiers of many 
traditional territories. New methodologies, novel sources of data and broader themes have 
continued to shed new light on conventional areas of finance related to agency costs, 
informational asymmetry and the incompleteness of contracts etc. Simultaneously, new and 
emerging areas linking finance to political environments, cultural dimensions or the 
importance of the role of gender (e.g. in boardrooms) have entered the arena of mainstream 
of corporate finance. The new empirical methodologies often exploit exogenous shocks to 
economies or institutions. They have deftly addressed concerns on endogeneity problems, 
omitted variable biases and other potential econometric problems that often plague empirical 
work (see, for example, the contribution of Roberts and Whited, 2013). These novel empirical 
methods in combination with unique datasets have helped researchers look into older 
questions in numerous fields (like determinants of firm value, dividend policy, financial 
structure, IPO, M & As, and so on) as well as introduce new themes with a higher degree of 
accuracy and precision and enriching almost every branch and sub-branch within the 
corporate finance literature. 
At the 2015 International Finance and Banking Society (IFABS) Corporate Finance 
Conference held at the Saïd Business School of the University of Oxford on 12-13 September, 
2015, three key themes emerged as participants strove to understand the interactions of 
internal and country specific systems and institutions with the forces of globalization of 
markets and firms’ bids for internationalization: 1. interactive institutions and markets, 2. 
structure of CEO compensations and 3. governance mechanisms in firms. 
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This special issue reflects some key contributions made at the conference to the debate 
above. It presents 17 papers that tackle the three themes mentioned above, keeping in mind 
the limitations of making a seamless blend of a wide range of papers under the umbrella of 
multiple but related themes. Each paper makes a significant contribution to the literature and 
we hope to draw out the unifying themes for the reader.  
 
2. Institutions and markets 
The papers in this category mostly deal with topics ranging from the contributions of 
both the younger venture capitalist (VC) and matured buyout (BO) firms segments of private 
equity and the restoration of credit rating agencies’ credibility in the post-crisis scenarios to 
the issues of IPO and capital structure in the context of both emerging and developed 
markets.  
Megginson et al. (2018) in this special issue explore whether the contribution of VCs to 
their client firms persists beyond the initial public offering (IPO) phase and investigates 
whether such IPOs exhibit lower risk profiles in post-IPO scenarios compared to non-VC 
backed entities. In addition to uncovering channels via which VCs exert such influences, the 
paper also explores the sources of systematic differences between VC and non-VC backed 
IPOs. Resolving these issues is non-trivial because theoretical arguments could go in favour of 
either VCs or sponsored firms. For example, VCs' special expertise in screening applicants 
might lead to a selection of firms with better ability of risk management in the post-IPO period. 
On the other hand, the certification effects of being selected by a VC might prompt other 
banks and financiers to lend to these firms more aggressively and contribute to their financial 
distress. Due to these multiple and contrasting trade-offs, the resolution to these questions is 
purely empirical. 
The paper, with the aid of a dataset spanning 1990 to 2007 covering a sample of 1,593 
US IPOs (with 27.5% VC backed IPOs) finds (after controlling for other key variables such as 
size and age) that the VC backed IPOs display a lower financial distress risk than non-VC backed 
firms, as the former as a group performs better within all standard measures of financial 
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distress risks (such as Z"-, ZM- and O-score). These results proved to be robust with OLS 
regressions that tested for financial distress risks for both VC and non-VC firms. 
Moreover, the differential effect shows up in lower costs of debt for the VC backed IPO 
firms. Another interesting finding of the paper is that IPOs with bank-affiliated VCs turn out to 
be less risky than their counterparts backed by independent VCs. The last finding is consistent 
with the fact that some VCs (especially those with corporate affiliations) are not constrained 
under the pressure of raising funds as they have access to internal parental organizational 
funding; hence, they can afford to choose firms that are less risky but with better longer-run 
prospects. 
The paper contributes to our understanding of the literature on VCs in multiple 
dimensions. First, it extends the earlier analysis which shows that VC backed firms exhibit 
lesser under-pricing in IPO (Megginson and Weiss 1991) and also confirms that such firms 
display lower risk profile in post IPO scenarios. These findings call for further attention towards 
the analysis of the dynamic impact of VCs’ contribution on sponsored firms’ financial and 
investment policies in post-IPO period. Second, the finding of differential performances of IPO 
firms for independent and bank-affiliated VCs also provides input for further analysis that 
might explain why seemingly similar activities (exit via IPO) performed by different forms of 
organization yield altogether very dissimilar outcomes. 
In a similar vein, Michala (2018) in this special issue combines both the younger (VC) and 
matured (buyout firms) arms of private equity (PE) sponsored firms to study their comparative 
economic and financial performances in the post-IPO scenarios.1 Broadly speaking, this paper 
investigates whether PE firms, in general, time their IPOs in hot markets to inflate valuations 
for the purpose of “loading lemons” to uninformed investors. This paper deals with questions 
often flagged by the media, with a comparative analysis of (a) degree of underpricing in IPOs 
and (b) probability of financial distress of such firms in post-IPO scenarios. 
                                                          
1 While there are some overlapping of functions between buyouts and VCs, many other 
important aspects like age profiles, mechanisms of control, security design, etc. vary 




The paper finds that although PE sponsors do time their target firms to enlist IPOs in hot 
markets, they do not do so with a frequency which is higher than stand-alone firms. Another 
related finding of the study is that the degree of underpricing tends to be smaller in BO backed 
firms compared to their benchmarks. Thus, according to the study, PEs in contrast to media 
and public perceptions, do not necessarily have the tendency to rush their clients into 
premature IPOs in comparison to benchmark firms. The paper also finds that BO and VC 
backed IPOs default less than others. The paper complements the study by Megginson et al. 
in this volume by extending their work on financial distress to BO firms. These two papers also 
employ different data sets and empirical methodologies. While the first paper uses different 
measures of financial distress, Michala’s paper uses multi-period logit regression framework 
for prediction in IPO pricing and post-IPO business failures leading to bankruptcies. 
A major feature of the PE firms is that they write elaborate contracts with their investee 
firm which often explicitly specify key features such as termination date (being a partnership 
organization), compensation structure for all stakeholders and fund size, among other 
attributes. Several theoretical and empirical studies show (see the references in Metrick and 
Yasuda, 2011) that very often such multi-dimensional contracts are in response to agency and 
information asymmetry problems.  
Fang (2018) in this special issue extends this literature to emerging markets, where the 
PEs in recent times have started becoming quite active in China and India. The central question 
of the paper is: why such PE funds in emerging markets often tend to have a shorter life span, 
with their structure of compensation being tied to it? To answer this question, the paper uses 
a setup where the manager of a PE fund, due to agency problems, has an incentive to burn 
money by undertaking risky but inefficient projects unless he is "in the money." Such “risk 
shifting” incentives, under a long-fused contract, lead the manager to opportunistically time 
her investments and burn money when early investments fail (i.e., when she is "out of the 
money"). Minimizing agency costs in this setup are shown to require both (a) a short fuse, 
which restricts the manager's timing to engage in opportunism, and (b) a low-powered 
incentive compensation that mitigates the money-burning tendency. However, such a 
(constrained) optimal financing arrangement can force the manager to concede rents to 
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investors in the fund due to the induced trade-off between rents to investors and curbing 
agency costs. So, the paper predicts that the equilibrium financing arrangement would be 
short-fused and leave some rents for investors in the presence of greater degree of agency 
costs due to a lack of strong enforcement mechanisms and institutional monitoring. The 
opposite holds true in developed markets due to the presence of stronger regulatory 
institutions. Thus, the paper draws parallel predictions on managerial behaviour, fund 
structure, and investment performance for both short-fused emerging-market and long-fused 
developed market PE structures and thus provides the basis for a comparative empirical study 
for the validation of these findings. 
Due to lack of co-ordination among themselves, small investors often tend to hold 
different opinions about the IPO firms even when they have same sources of information (e.g. 
IPO prospectus); see Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1999). A large body of literature documents 
that the presence of large shareholders (PE or institutional shareholders) can reduce the 
degree of such heterogeneous belief. This can be achieved if small investors could observe the 
magnitude of IPO stockholding and the price paid by large shareholders. This is consequent to 
the fact that the latter would buy equity shares of a relatively unknown company only if their 
expected returns exceeded the costs of production of information about the quality of such 
IPO firms. However, the quantity of shares purchased and the price paid by large shareholders 
are often conducted privately through negotiated settlements unless legal mandates explicitly 
call for the transparency of such transactions. Hence,  legal regimes that  mandate allocation 
of shares and the process of price setting (fixed price or auction),  to be in the domain of public 
information help the price discovery process  in IPO markets more efficient.  
Samdani (2018) in this special issue investigates whether changes in the regulatory rules 
in India, purported to create a direct impact on the book building process, helped to narrow 
the gap between investors' belief about IPO stocks in the country. The setup here is a 2009 
legal mandate whereby the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI, the regulatory body in 
the Indian stock market) allowed anchor or large qualified institutional investors to receive a 
guaranteed share allocation at a fixed price in the pre-market price discovery phase. The new 
law revived the book building process by reversing its earlier decisions and gave underwriters 
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more discretionary power to allocate shares to preferred large investors but ensured that both 
price and quantity of shares settled in such transactions are announced in the public domain. 
The law passed by the SEBI served an almost similar purpose to that of a quasi-natural 
experiment, which the author exploits to determine whether it reduces the heterogeneity of 
investors' beliefs associated with above-market-average earnings, finding that the mandated 
transparency, thrust upon anchor investors before public filing, reduced the degree of 
dispersion among investors' beliefs associated with reported earnings, and thereby improved 
the price discovery process. The enacted law also sped up the time by which new information 
was reflected in market prices and the result is independent of accounting standards and 
financial reporting quality. The paper’s findings illuminate the role and contributions of 
regulatory institutions toward the process of fair price determination, however further 
research should investigate potential costs of such transparencies, which might have a 
negative impact on participation by large (anchor) investors. 
 The next two papers deal with the effectiveness of grades on bonds issued by rating 
agencies, which have been battered badly by the media and regulatory institutions in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The US congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have undertaken a series of pro-active steps in the aftermath of a chain of business 
failures of firms (like World.com, Enron), whereby many had earned investment grades from 
rating agencies just before filing the chapter 11 code of bankruptcy. Such efforts by lawmakers 
resulted in the legislation of the Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Reform Act in 2006. Later further 
legal measures to promote the transparency and timeliness of ratings have been adopted, 
especially in the post sub-prime crisis era of 2009, when many loss-making structured 
products also received inflated ratings; see Griffin and Tang (2012). By now, we have sufficient 
data to address the question of whether such legal mandates and measures together with 
reputational considerations of the CRAs have improved the timeliness and accuracy of ratings 
and restored their credibility to users. 
 For example, Berwart et al. (2018) in this special issue look for the existence of any lead-
lag relationship between issuer verses investor paid ratings to investigate this question. Other 
than the fact that in the former the issuer pays the CRA fee upfront, while mostly the investor 
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pays it upfront (in most cases) in the latter, there are other innate differences between the 
two forms of rating that have a direct bearing on the quality of information dissemination of 
issued grades. While issuer-sponsored ratings could suffer from an upward bias (as the 
objective of the issuer is to receive the highest rather than the most accurate ratings) and 
competition between CRAs could even lead to a “race to the bottom” of rating inflation, the 
investor-initiated ratings could suffer from both free rider problem across the investors and 
default on payments from the issuer inflicted by lower ratings. However, regulatory 
intervention could cost the CRAs their reputation and damage investors' confidence in the 
reliability of ratings, which potentially could outweigh the short-term gains from the increased 
issuer fees from inflated ratings. However, to what extent such concerns could bring back the 
timeliness of ratings and restore the credibility of the CRAs is an empirical question to which 
this paper turns its attention.  
Using a Granger causality analysis and an ordered-probit framework (due to ordinal 
nature of rating), the paper finds that, in the wake of reforms, prior changes in ratings by the 
investor-paid ratings would significantly increase the probability of similar actions by the other 
type of agencies in a window of six months. However, this causality turned bi-directional after 
2002, indicating some degree of recovery of investors’ trust by the CRAs. However, the paper 
also finds that investor-paid downgrades become associated with more negative, statistically 
significant abnormal stock returns than issuer-paid downgrades. Together, these results imply 
that although the market's confidence in the ratings paid for by the issuer was building up, the 
pace was slow and gradual.  
In a similar vein, Driss et al. (2018) in this special issue focus on the CRAs but address the 
general perception of the negative image of the CRAs from the perspective of lenders, who 
would be wary of lending to firms even when receiving high grades on their current bonds 
from CRAs. To analyse the issue, the authors are utilizing an event called “credit watch”, 
whereby a CRA, upon receipt of a negative signal, issues a warning of the future possible 
ratings downgrade unless the firm undertakes (costly) action to reverse the situation. 
Typically, CRAs either confirm the original rating after the end of the watch period or the firm 
is downgraded. Thus, a “credit watch” could serve as an early warning system and it could 
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affect a firm's financial and investment policies if the lenders place some importance on the 
abilities of the CRAs. The “credit watch” event, in that case, disseminates information about 
the recipient firms and also calls for a greater monitoring of their activities by CRAs and lenders 
inside the watch period. 
Using a dataset of Moody's watch assignments spanning the period from 1992 to 2014 
(with 27% confirmation in the sample), the paper finds that those firms on an average received 
confirmed initial ratings after the watch period, had their financial constraints relaxed 
(indicated by the WW-index of Whited and Wu (2006) and the measures of cash flow-
investment gap as in Rajan and Zingales (1998)), procured a higher level of long-term debt 
financing, and increased their physical investment and experienced growth of assets in the 
four quarters after the end of the watch period. Of course, the endogeneity issues often cloud 
empirical findings because the firms who avoided downgrades could be the better ones and 
their performances might not be related to the early warning and monitoring by the CRAs. To 
address these issues, the authors properly matched both confirmed and non-confirmed firms 
along similar lines of relevant attributes such as size, Tobin's Q, etc. and also ran differences 
and differences regressions on outcomes before and after the watch period to weed out 
potential endogeneity germane in such problems. Finally, the paper also employed a switching 
regression model with the endogenous switching of grades to deal with the biases due to the 
omitted variables problem. To sum up, both studies attempt to determine whether media 
outcry and public intervention in the post-Enron scandal and financial crisis have triggered any 
substantive changes in CRAs’ behaviour. The paper by Driss et al addressed this issue from the 
banks' point of view and the previous paper by Berwart et al looked at the same problem from 
the sources of payments of different types of ratings. The emerging theme in both is that the 
CRAs have gained only a partial restoration of their creditability in the post-crisis period, 
signifying that once it has been damaged, it takes time for a reputation to be fully restored. 
Kale et al. (2018) discuss how the presence of the “outside option” of employees in a 
firm weakens the debt's power to discipline them and thus impacts capital structure. By 
issuing debt, companies can threaten their workers with bearing part of the bankruptcy costs, 
which reduces their ex ante bargaining power. However, such a threat is vacuous if workers 
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have the option to quit the organization. By using US data from between 1978 and 2007, this 
study documents that outside options weaken the impact of leverage on labour productivity. 
To control the endogeneity problem and its confounding impact on causal relationships 
between leverage and employee productivity due to time-varying unobservable attributes, 
the authors used proper instrumental variables (relating to firm's incentives to avoid taxes 
from the exogenous government policies rather than leverage-induced tax shields) and also 
conducted two-stage least squares methods. Finally, the paper also used the implementation 
of NAFTA as an exogenous shock (which also serves as a quasi-natural experiment) to verify 
the robustness of the results. The ideas contained in the paper can thus be extended to 
situations like cyclical movements of the economy, which is related to voluntary quits by the 
workers. 
The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis prompted a series of reforms aimed at restructuring 
the regional bond markets (i.e., Asian Bond Funds in 2003 and 2005, ABF and ABF-2 
respectively). However, not all countries have joined such a policy intervention. These reforms 
supposedly had several effects on a range of issues, including liquidity expansion in domestic 
bond markets, liberalization of foreign exchange markets, tax reforms for foreign investors 
and regulatory improvement (see Packer and Remolona, 2012). 
Bose et al (2018) examine the implications of such initiatives on enhancing firms' access 
to external finance in the economies that joined such a policy compared to those opting not 
to participate. The study digs further by investigating whether particular segments of firms 
took more initiatives to take advantage of these initiatives to alleviate the lack of access to 
external finance. The study builds its research design around the argument that some of these 
components may prove more attractive than others. Thus, for instance, this provided firms 
with opportunities to switch from banks to external debt or equity markets or to issue more 
long-term debt. 
A robust method is employed to analyse a panel dataset of 7286 firms from eight Asian 
economies.2 The findings show that firms in their sample experience a decline in the 
                                                          
2 Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan 
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proportion of short-term debt to total debt after the introduction of the ABF2. However, post 
ABF2 the long-term debt to asset ratio seems to relatively increase. The reforms have 
improved firms' access to long-term debt. There is, however, a discrepancy of the effect, as 
among these firms the profitable and less risky firms seem to benefit significantly compared 
to others. The access to long-term sources of funds enabled profitable and less risky firms to 
finance their investments.  
The policy implication of their result is that the ABF2 initiative was successful and 
achieved its goal of promoting the growth of the Asian bond market and contributed to the 
region's improved economic performance as well as provided a lesson to other emerging 
markets, including some countries in Latin America. The study indeed provides valuable 
insights for the literature and policymakers on multiple fronts. First, such an initiative seems 
to ease the pressure on the banks being the primary resource of funding in these 
economies. Second, the markets, as usual, tend to favour efficient firms (i.e., profitable and 
less risky). Therefore, these initiatives should also include more in-depth strategies to assist 
struggling firms in accessing finance (in particular long-term) or at least in improving their 
performance to appeal to the capital market. 
 Entrepreneurs' reputation information has attracted the attention of many studies ever 
since Diamond (1989), highlighting that an entrepreneur's acquisition of a reputation plays a 
vital role in facilitating the market between borrowers and lenders. However, the dilemma in 
observing reputation is that it requires repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders. 
In an environment of information asymmetry and incomplete contracts, such an issue seems 
to be further complicated for first-time issuers of debt. 
Finally, this section ends with the paper by Li and Martin (2018). They examine the 
capital raising process in a crowdfunding setup by using data from Kickstarter. They collect 
records of entrepreneurs’ activities related to promised deliveries, as well as their funding 
history, to sketch their reputation formation. The study uses daily data from the Kickstarter 




website on 2826 initiated projects during the period 3-23 May 2013. The authors construct 
reputation-related proxies, entrepreneur characteristics, project characteristics, and reward 
characteristics from the first day of the funding period to avoid look-ahead bias. The final 
sample of the study is reduced to 1398 projects with funding goals over the median ($5500), 
of which 36% have met their funding goals. 
The findings provide evidence that entrepreneur reputation affects capital formation 
outcomes favourably regarding both degree and speed. Entrepreneurs who accumulated a 
positive reputation through previously delivery are 40% more likely to get funded. Those who 
acquired a negative reputation are 20% less likely to be financed. First timers with high skills 
are successful in attracting funds and tend to exceed their funding goal by 60%. The authors 
succeed in providing evidence to support their propositions. The study takes advantage of the 
fact that Kickstarter reports those entrepreneurs who fail to acquire funds and use it to 
examine various capital formations and contracting theories. The findings of the paper 
advocate that entrepreneur reputation in the capital formation process has a crucial effect. 
The results also send an encouraging message to financial institutions to rely on non-
traditional social media data besides traditional approaches (i.e., funder characteristics, 
project characteristics, or timing of backing) for funding decision-making.  
  
3. Structure of governance 
Recently, institutions ranging from regulatory bodies to stock exchanges across the 
globe have been consciously pushing reforms related to boardroom cultures, audit practices 
and compensation structures in order to bring about changes to the state of governance in 
firms. 
The papers reviewed in this section address these issues at length and explore to what 
extent such legal mandates or the opening of global access impact the governance structure 
of firms and trace their consequences on firm value. These exogenous changes in legal and 
economic environments tend to perturb the equilibrium structures of board size, its structure 
and its composition (e.g., independent and non-independent directors) if firms ignored such 
constraints prior to imposition of such legal mandates. In that case, one would expect to 
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observe variations in outcome induced by the changes in policies and papers investigating the 
issues in detail. Two other themes relevant to this section are: 1. Do these changes in legal 
mandates or economic environments create governance externalities whereby initial changes 
in governance in one set of firms bring about similar changes in other passive sets of firms? 2. 
If they do, then what are the most important channels through which such changes take 
place? In the context of board setup, it implies that the pertinent channels could be either 
through board monitoring and CEO career concerns or via changes in the advisory role of the 
board, which often communicates with CEOs in an incomplete information setup (see the 
survey contribution by Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). 
Aggarwal et al. (2018) attempt to address these issues by utilizing mandates that have 
affected the boardroom practices of 30% of the newly listed firms in the NYSE and NASDAQ 
from 2003 onwards. The paper finds that affected firms had lower values before the 
governance intervention by the exchanges and they indeed experienced a relative increase in 
value after its implementation. However, the gaps in value between the affected and 
unaffected firms (from the mandate) did not close completely. A closer inspection revealed 
that difference in corporate culture (defined by a set of measures of governance which 
included other key governance attributes not included by the mandate) between the control 
(unaffected) and treatment (affected) firms played a key role in explaining the gap. Thus, the 
paper finds that although the changes in governance mechanism external to the firm may 
create spillover effects in firms with relatively poor governance structure, the “old methods 
and practice,” which are not always shareholder friendly, nevertheless do not disappear 
immediately and there is a strong bias towards the persistence of governance gaps across the 
firm. An interesting research question could be to study the determinants of the trade-off of 
poor governance (leading to losses of share values affecting insiders as well) and other 
benefits that accrue to insiders from the persistence of low-level governance that might 
identify and narrow the sets of crucial factors resisting changes in methods of governance. 
Similarly, in this special issue, the impact of changes in legal mandates are examined in 
Dahya et al. (2018). They focus on acquirers’ returns in the United Kingdom. Two reports 
published in UK with a gap of twelve years (the Cadbury Report 1992 and the Higgs Report 
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2004) explicitly called for the deployment of independent directors and other practices of 
governances. The Cadbury Report recommended at least three independent directors for 
publicly listed corporations and the code contained other prescriptions for good governance 
practices via changing norms for control, reporting functions of the board, tenures of 
members to functions and roles of auditors and extent of disclosures. This paper finds that 
firms there exist in a positive relationship between acquirers’ returns and the fraction of the 
outside directors for the publicly listed firms rather than private firms. Hence, outside 
directors could potentially add greater value to publicly listed firms compared to a similar deal 
taking place between private firms. The result brings about the role of the reputation concerns 
of the director of the publicly listed firms because they face greater scrutiny from the financial 
markets, while such firms also have stronger disclosure requirements. The results also confirm 
the theoretical predictions stating that the main functions of the directors are advising and 
monitoring, and publicly traded firms employ directors with expertise on those areas so that 
the selection of targets and deals are thus more value enhancing in listed than in private firms. 
Although the firm performance and other governance attributes (e.g., fraction of 
independent directors) are positively correlated, concerns for endogeneity often make it 
harder to draw inferences on the causal relationships between them. However, in recent 
times, there have been both government and exchange mandated calls for changes in 
governance structure; in practice, such laws often change the paradigms for governance and 
both papers have deftly used exogenous changes in legal norms and variations in observed 
outcome to draw conclusions on outcome as well as the prospective channels that make such 
outcomes happen more likely. 
In recent years, the scale of cross-border acquisitions across the countries has 
experienced a surge and recent data show even larger buying sprees of the emerging markets’ 
multinational firms in such a process. Such phenomena are new and have been made possible 
as governments in these countries have undertaken several reforms that relaxed constraints 
towards cross-border physical and financial movements of capital. Legal scholars have put 
forward a “bonding hypothesis”, which asserts that such acquisitions tend to benefit emerging 
market firms. This is because such firms can use newly found opportunities of making overseas 
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investment to absorb improved corporate governance practices, not just as a legal compulsion 
but also for enhancing reputational considerations.  
Col and Sen (2018) investigate whether acquiring firms from the emerging markets have 
been able to improve their standards of governance following cross-border acquisitions. They 
study a selected a group of Indian firms who had undertaken takeovers of the foreign firms 
located in the developed markets and report that both practices and attributes of the board 
change significantly after cross-border acquisitions, and the stronger the legal regime in the 
target country, the larger the effects on firm governances; consequently, the post acquisition 
values of these firms have increased significantly. 
A major concern in such studies is the endogeneity problem, because decisions 
regarding takeovers and the choice of appropriate locations (i.e., from where to buy another 
firm) are not random. Hence, there is always a possibility that only good firms make those 
acquisitions and that choice of target countries may not matter much. The authors have tried 
to address these issues by choosing firms with a propensity score matching method, whereby 
the selected characteristics are likely to increase the probability of acquisitions and also 
conducted further analysis with the matching process to resolve the issue. However, a more 
complete analysis would have been to use some legal mandates relaxing cross-border 
investments in a specific country to examine the bonding hypothesis. Thus, more work needs 
to be done in these directions that would confirm such results on a firmer footing. 
Finally, the paper by Koch and Okamura (2018) discusses the features of the banks sued 
by the FDIC following their business failures and compares these with the ones not being sued 
and find that the former group indeed displayed “risk shifting tendencies” prior to proposed 
legal action by the FDIC. The sued firms exhibited faster asset growth and made larger short-
term borrowing to the extent of endangering shareholders’ interests. An interesting find in 
the paper is the positive ex ante impact of the litigation on the standard of governance of the 
out of the sample peer groups. The study suggests that institutional and legal monitoring via 
the threat of lawsuits could have a dynamic impact on the bank governance process. 
 
4. CEO compensations 
17 
 
A large volume of the literature already exists on this subject, capturing multiple 
dimensions of relevant topics in the field (see Frydman and Jenter 2010). A particular area of 
interest is the determination of size and composition of CEO pay. The recent increase in CEO 
compensation has been explained by both optimal contracting paradigms and the CEO power 
hypothesis. This literature primarily focuses on the process of determination of compensation 
contracts by the compensation committee set up by the board, which supposedly acts without 
outside influence of any sort. However, there is often outside interference (media, 
governments etc.) in the process of setting the limits to CEO compensation. The next two 
papers complement this literature by highlighting the role of direct or indirect intervention by 
the government and its impact on CEO compensation and firm value. 
Hadley (2018) in this special issue investigates the magnitude and composition of CEO 
compensations in companies whose revenues mostly depend on government contracts for 
delivering supplies. Such firms provide interesting examples of case studies because they are 
often subject to both government scrutiny and media coverage. Hence, it is very natural that 
such firms would have a tendency to incur costs for deflecting the possibility of unwanted 
negative attention which could spell termination of future contracts and would thereby affect 
revenues adversely. The paper is exploring whether such politically sensitive firms change 
their compensation policy to reduce excess pay and also change its composition in order to 
avert negative reactions to them by the media and other watchdogs. 
To address these issues, the author analyses a sample of data consisting of federal 
government contractors from 2000 to 2011 and finds that in order to defray political 
sensitivities, such firms indeed pay a lower number of excessive compensations, which 
interestingly take the form of cash rather than equity. The paper also finds that these firms 
also exhibit lower pay to performance sensitivities. However, some of these results get 
reversed for larger firms in the sample, which tend to pay the CEOs in excess, displaying a 
greater degree of bargaining power.  
While this paper sets the agency issues and limits to CEO power and compensation in 
the context of governmental contracts for procurements of supplies, the paper by Raff and 
Siming (2018) examines the influence of prestigious government awards giving non-pecuniary 
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benefits to the CEOs (and other recipients of the prize) on the firm value and shareholders’ 
return. The paper uses a century-old convention in New Zealand, where the country’s 
government rewards titles of knighthoods and damehoods every year to selected citizens. A 
law abolished the custom in 2004 but it was reinstated in 2009 and thus provides the setup of 
a quasi natural experiment where it is possible to find out whether the program had an impact 
on firm value via any possible influence on the decision-making power of the CEOs. The paper 
shows that while abolishing the law certainly increased the operating margins of the 
treatment group vis-à-vis control groups (not affected by the law), such figures also declined 
after its reintroduction. The paper reports that announcement effects of both reforms on 
shareholders’ returns were negative and indeed increased the enrolments of workers, to a 
possible detriment of shareholders’ interests. Both papers in different setups thus highlight 
tensions in government objectives (e.g., maximizing employment) and shareholders’ interests 
(increasing value of their shares), which influence CEO decision-making power via changes in 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. 
Fidrmuc and Xia (2018) investigate whether incentive (stock ownership) and severance 
payments (golden parachutes) impact the motivations of the CEOs of a target firm to initiate 
the M & A process. A CEO with significant ownership in a firm might try to sell his company 
earlier upon receipt of imminent bad news. The extant literature suggests a smaller premium 
from rational acquirers who might suspect adverse selection problems. Also, a target-initiated 
sale could reduce a CEO’s bargaining power if the other party perceives her to be too impatient 
and in a hurry to sell the firm. However, this paper argues that while information or bargaining 
issues might lower the incentives for the CEO of the target company to engage in proactive 
negotiations with the buyer, CEO ownership and contractual arrangements (magnitude of 
stock ownership and severance payments) may alter the incentives and could play a 
countervailing role in the process. The paper finds that higher CEO ownerships show not only 
a more positive relationship with firm performance, it is also likely that the CEOs of these firms 
would take a proactive role in initiating deals to start the process of M & As. 
The authors conduct a further analysis and show that CEO incentives increase the odds 
of target deal initiation only in informal sales but not in formal, full-scale auctions. This result 
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suggests that managerial incentives to initiate deals are higher in private negotiations when 
the CEOs have greater power in negotiations than in other mechanisms, such as auctions, 
where much of the control lies in outside buyers. Finally, the paper shows that the CEO-
initiated deals also fetch higher takeover premiums. To sum up, it shows that ownership by 
the CEO not only matter for the initiation of sales but is also specific to situations where they 
have control (negotiations) and not when a firm is likely to be put up for sale in a competitive 
auction market. This is certainly an interesting find which awaits a theoretical structure to 
explain why it is tied to method of sale.  
A large volume of the literature documents that the cost of corruption is an antagonistic 
phenomenon that hinders economic growth and erodes efficiency at both the micro and 
macro levels (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). This paper examines the effects of 
corruption on efficiency at the firm level. Hanousek et al. (2018) in this special issue extend its 
scope to explore the role that key stakeholders play in firms operating within corrupt 
environments. Two interesting arguments seem to underline the foundation of this paper’s 
research design. The first result confirms that firms operating in an environment perceived to 
be more corrupt will be less efficient than those operating in one which is regarded as less 
corrupt. The second result argues that heterogeneity in the perceptions of corruption may 
have a positive effect on firm efficiency. They trace the positive effect to the differences in 
perceptions of corruption, which may signal the presence of different “sub-environments”. 
They claim that there is a possibility to find firms that operate freely in a corrupt environment 
due to their lower propensity to bribe. Thus, greater heterogeneity in perceptions of 
corruption may be associated, on average, with more efficiency. The study examines a number 
of firm attributes that are likely to be associated with a lower propensity to bribe. Two groups 
of stakeholders, namely owners and managers, are more likely to be responsible for bribing 
decision. Accordingly, investigating how the characteristics of owners and managers affect the 
efficiency-corruption relationship forms the core of their analysis. 
The study obtains data on corruption and other business environment characteristics 
from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) developed by the 
EBRD and the World Bank. The authors match BEEPS to the Amadeus database maintained by 
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Bureau van Dijk to complement the missing accounting data. Their final sample is composed 
of 76,552 observations and covers 14 countries in Central and Eastern Europe from 2000 to 
2013. The study employs a stochastic frontier analysis to estimate technical efficiency. 
The results indicate that foreign-owned firms are adversely affected by high levels of 
average corruption. Hence, foreign owners are likely to lack the knowledge of whom to bribe. 
Thus, they are at a disadvantage in relation to local owners. An interesting finding of the paper 
is that foreign-owned firms seem to mitigate this liability by locating in sub-environments 
where corruption is less common. The result also postulates that a female CEO who is less 
inclined to corruption tends to be disadvantaged by a high level of average corruption. The 
paper points towards the importance of both owners’ and managers’ awareness of the 
characteristics of the local operating environment. In other words, those who wish to run their 
business honestly still have the opportunity to avoid the antagonistic effect of a highly corrupt 
environment (on average), by locating their businesses in sub-environments with less 
corruption. 
 
5. The challenges ahead 
The papers in this collection have addressed issues in governance structures, CEO 
compensations and interactions between institutions and markets in a fast changing global 
milieu. While institutions often gradually adapt to changes in external circumstances due to 
inertia or collective action problems, investors’ reactions to such changes are far more rapid. 
A unifying element present in many papers in this volume is that such uneven and different 
speed of adjustment often create frictions and had impact on key variables such as reputation, 
firm value, leverage etc.  
Recent phenomena like surge in shareholders’ activisms demand for greater diversity in 
boards and network building exercises done in both traditional connections and vibrant social 
media often are adding newer constraints in the decision making process of firms and thus 
raising new research questions for further dig up. Some of the plausible questions are:   Does 
too much external intervention force the CEOs to adopt cautious policies (to minimize 
negative attention) at the costs of firm value?  
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The social media along with transactions in retail stores along with online companies 
often generate big data on prices and quantities that offer insights on consumer preferences 
or quality of supply chains and bring questions to the table. Do such findings have any 
influence on business, finance and investment policies adopted by such firms? New 
institutions like crowd funding often rely on networks from social media to raise financing 
especially in lesser developed financial markets. Is such huge flow of information and 
interactions in such systems of networks alleviating information asymmetry or making flow of 
information noisier for companies in these platforms?  
Answering such questions involve not only careful processing of huge databases but also 
require resolving of multi-dimensional measurement issues in conceptual frameworks 
(diversity or network strengths), inherent biases due to endogeneity and related econometric 
problems, etc. Challenges in the future lie in building up appropriate methods specific to 
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